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Commercial Law and Consumer
Credit
By HAROLD R. WEINBERG*
The most significant development during the past survey
year was the demise of the holder in due course doctrine and
other related doctrines which insulated creditors financing con-
sumer sales from consumer claims and defenses. As a result of
this development, consumers will now be able to assert claims
or defenses arising out of the sale financed against the financer
under certain circumstances. Other developments also sur-
veyed herein relate to the Uniform Commercial Code statutes
of frauds and prejudgment creditors' remedies.
I. THE DEMISE OF THE HOLDER IN DUE COURSE AND RELATED
DOCTRINES
Late in 1975 the Federal Trade Commission promulgated
a trade regulation rule, effective May 14, 1976,' which operates
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky. A.B. 1966, Western Reserve
University; J.D. 1969, Case Western Reserve University; LL.M. 1975, University of
Illinois. The author wishes to thank Dale W. Bruckner, a third year student at the
College of Law, for his assistance in the preparation of this article.
16 C.F.R. § 433.1 (1975) provides:
(a) Person. An individual, corporation, or any other business organiza-
tion.
(b) Consumer. A natural person who seeks or acquires goods or services
for personal, family, or household use.
(c) Creditor. A person who, in the ordinary course of business, lends pur-
chase money or finances the sale of goods or services to consumers on a
deferred payment basis; Provided, such person is not acting, for the purposes
of a particular transaction, in the capacity of a credit card issuer.
(d) Purchase money loan. A cash advance which is received by a con-
sumer in return for a "Finance Charge" within the meaning of the Truth in
Lending Act and Regulation Z, which is applied, in whole or substantial
part, to a purchase of goods or services from a seller who (1) refers consumers
to the creditor or (2) is affiliated with the creditor by common control,
contract, or business arrangement.
(e) Financing a sale. Extending credit to a consumer in connection with
a "credit sale" within the meaning of the Truth in Lending Act and Regula-
tion Z.
(f) Contract. Any oral or written agreement, formal or informal, between
a creditor and a seller, which contemplates or provides for cooperative or
concerted activity in connection with the sale of goods or services to consum-
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to preserve claims and defenses against creditors who finance
many types of common consumer transactions, and authorizes
monetary recoveries from these creditors under certain circum-
stances. The Kentucky General Assembly enacted legislation 2
ers or the financing thereof.
(g) Business arrangement. Any understanding, procedure, course of deal-
ing, or arrangement, formal or informal, between a creditor and a seller, in
connection with the sale of goods or services to consumers or the financing
thereof.
(h) Credit card issuer. A person who extends to cardholders the right to
use a credit card in connection with purchases of goods or services.
(i) Consumer credit contract. Any instrument which evidences or embod-
ies a debt arising from a "Purchase Money Loan" transaction or a "financed
sale" as defined in paragraphs (d) and (e).
j) Seller. A person who, in the ordinary course of business, sells or leases
goods or services to consumers.
§ 433.2 provides:
In connection with any sale or lease of goods or services to consumers, in or
affecting commerce as "commerce" is defined in the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act, it is an unfair or deceptive act or practice within the meaning of
Section 5 of that Act for a seller, directly or indirectly, to:
(a) Take or receive a consumer credit contract which fails to contain the
following provision in at least ten point, bold face, type:
Notice
Any holder of this consumer credit contract is subject to all claims and
defenses which the debtor could assert against the seller of goods or services
obtained pursuant hereto or with the proceeds hereof. Recovery hereunder
by the debtor shall not exceed amounts paid by the debtor hereunder.
or, (b) Accept, as full or partial payment for such sale or lease, the proceeds
of any purchase money loan (as purchase money loan is defined herein),
unless any consumer credit contract made in connection with such purchase
money loan contains the following provision in at least ten point, bold face,
type:
Notice
Any holder of this consumer credit contract is subject to all claims and
defenses which the debtor could assert against the seller of goods or services
obtained with the proceeds hereof. Recovery hereunder by the debtor shall
not exceed amounts paid by the debtor hereunder.
2 Ky. Rav. STAT. § 367.600 (1976) [hereinafter cited as KRS] provides:
As used in KRS 367.610:
(1) "Person" means an individual, corporation, or any other business or-
ganization.
(2) "Consumer" means a natural person who seeks or acquires goods or
services for personal, family, or household use.
(3) "Creditor" means a person who, in the ordinary course of business,
lends purchase money or finances the sale of goods or services to consumers
on a deferred payment basis, provided such person is not acting, for the
purposes of a particular transaction, in the capacity of a credit card issuer.
(4) "Purchase money loan" means a cash advance which is received by a
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during its 1976 regular session which addresses some of the
same matters included within the FTC rule. The Kentucky
Act, however, exempts from its coverage consumer credit con-
tracts which comply with the FTC rule or other federal admin-
istrative regulations relating to the preservation of consumer
claims and defenses in credit transactions. Both the FTC rule
and the Kentucky legislation will be discussed after a brief
review of the consumer sales finance practices at which they
are directed.
A. Smiling Creditors, Caponized Debtors
The law has traditionally provided the means for a creditor
to arrange the financing of a sale transaction so that the credi-
tor will be legally entitled to payment in full even if the buyer
has a legitimate defense arising out of the transaction financed.
One approach was through the holder in due course doctrine
which historically developed to protect good faith purchasers
of commercial paper.3 Under this doctrine, the transferee of a
negotiable instrument, such as a promissory note, is insulated
consumer in return for a finance charge, which is applied, in whole or sub-
stantial part, to a purchase of goods or services from a seller who (a) refers
consumers to the creditor or (b) is affiliated with the creditor by common
control, contract, or business arrangement.
(5) "Consumer credit contract" means any instrument which evidences or
embodies a debt arising from a "purchase money loan" transaction or in
which credit is extended by a seller or lessor in connection with a sale or lease
to a consumer.
KRS § 367.610 provides:
(1) With respect to any consumer credit contract taken in connection with
any purchase money transaction, an assignee of the rights of the seller or
lessor is subject to all defenses of the buyer against the seller or lessor arising
out of the sale or lease notwithstanding an agreement to the contrary, but
the assignee's liability under this section may not exceed the amount owing
to the assignee at the time the defense is asserted against the assignee. Rights
of the buyer or lessee under this section can only be asserted as a matter of
defense to or set off against a claim by the assignee.
(2) This section shall not apply to any consumer credit contract taken in
connection with any purchase money loan or any sale or lease of goods or
services which is in compliance with any trade regulation issued or promul-
gated by the federal trade commission or any regulation of the board of
governors of the federal reserve system or similar federal agency having
jurisdiction relating to preservation of consumer claims and defenses in
credit transactions.
See generally Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63
YALE L.J. 1057 (1954).
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from all but a few relatively unusual types of defenses of any
party to the instrument with whom he has not dealt. To invoke
the doctrine, however, it required that the instrument have
been taken for value, in good faith, and without notice that it
was overdue, dishonored, or of any defense against it or claim
to it.,
The holder in due course doctrine could come into play in
the consumer credit arena as follows. A consumer would pur-
chase goods such as a food freezer or services such as the instal-
lation of aluminum siding on credit, and would execute a prom-
issory note for the unpaid balance plus a finance charge. The
promissory note would contain an unconditional promise to
pay.5 The seller of the goods or services would then negotiate
the note, containing the promise to pay, to a sales financer who
would pay the seller the face value of the note minus an agreed
discount.6 The financer, as a holder in due course, could enforce
the promise to pay even if a defense arose for the consumer
because the freezer failed to freeze or the aluminum siding fell
off the house.
The same sort of insulation from defenses could be
achieved by the creditor if, rather than accepting a note, it
purchased from the seller an installment sales contract con-
taining a waiver of defense clause. Such clauses, which are
See KRS §§ 355.3-302 and -305 (1958). Even a holder in due course will be
subject to the "real" defenses of
(a) infancy, to the extent that it is a defense to a simple contract; and
(b) such other incapacity, or duress, or illegality of the transaction, as
renders the obligation of the party a nullity; and
(c) such misrepresentation as has induced the party to sign the instrument
with neither knowledge nor reasonable opportunity to obtain knowledge of
its character or its essential terms; and
(d) discharge in insolvency proceedings; and
(e) any other discharge of which the holder has notice when he takes the
instrument.
KRS § 355.3-305 (1958).
See KRS § 355.3-104 (1958).
The seller would be willing to accept the discounted amount for a variety of
reasons. For example, the seller would obtain it immediately rather than the larger
amount in installments over a period of time and would avoid the administrative cost
of carrying and collecting the consumer installment obligation. The discount transac-
tion might also be a part of a floor planning arrangement in which the seller is able to
attract inventory financing from a financer at a relatively low interest rate by transfer-
ring his consumer paper, representing consumer debt at a higher interest rate, to the
same financer.
[Vol. 65
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recognized by Kentucky law,7 would contain language such as
the following:
Buyer hereby acknowledges notice that the contract may
be assigned and that assignees will rely upon the agreements
contained in this paragraph, and agrees that the liability of
the Buyer to any assignee shall be immediate and absolute
and not affected by any default whatsoever of the Seller sign-
ing this contract; and in order to induce assignees to purchase
this contract, the Buyer further agrees not to set up any claim
against such Seller as a defense, counterclaim or offset to any
action by any assignee for the unpaid balance of the purchase
price or for possession of the property.'
Thus, a creditor engaged in consumer sales financing might
also achieve his freedom from defenses by the means of an
agreement not to assert defenses by the buyer.
The third way in which a sales financer could achieve free-
dom from defenses was by making a direct loan which would
enable the consumer to purchase goods or services in a subse-
quent transaction with a seller. If the goods or services pur-
chased proved to be defective, the consumer could not rely on
any resultant defense or claim against the seller as a defense
against paying the creditor because the loan was considered for
legal purposes to be a separate and distinct transaction from
the sale.
Of course, occasions arose in which the consumer goods or
services purchased were not satisfactory. Even if the seller
could be located and was solvent, the consumer might find that
without being able to utilize the leverage of withholding pay-
ment, the seller could not be persuaded to satisfy a legitimate
claim. The value of the claim or defense would often be insuffi-
cient to justify retaining an attorney. Moreover, cases arose in
which the seller had disappeared or was insolvent. In these
situations the consumer was required to pay for defective goods
or services with no effective recourse available against anyone.
This result might have been justifiable, despite its harsh-
ness, if it had been adequately supported by some significant
I See KRS §§ 355.2-210 and 355.9-206 (1958) and note 10 infra. See also KRS §§
371.320 (1962) and 371.325 (1974).
This particular clause was held to be contrary to public policy in Unico v. Owen,
232 A.2d 405, 408 (N.J. 1967).
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public policy.' For example, if the consumer had actually bar-
gained for cut-off defenses, the result might have been sus-
tained on the basis of freedom of contract. Or, if the consumer
and the seller were strangers to the financer and the financer
needed holder in due course protection to make his sales-
finance business possible, then the result might have been sus-
tained by policies in favor of protecting purchasers of commer-
cial paper or facilitating such paper's marketability. The
sanctity of direct loans might have been sustained on the prin-
ciple that the lender ought to be free from claims or defenses
arising out of a contract to which he was not a party, since
making the lender responsible for the quality of the goods or
services would go beyond the lender's or consumer's expecta-
tions or intent. However, such policy support often broke down
in light of the facts. Consumers do not normally read through
paragraphs of boiler plate in installment sales agreements to
find waiver of defense clauses, nor do they normally under-
stand them if they have the fortitude or good fortune to dis-
cover them. A lender who is accepting a substantial portion of
a seller's consumer paper will have more than a nodding ac-
quaintence with the seller, his business practices, and the
credit worthiness of the seller's customers. The "separateness"
of a direct loan becomes less self-evident when the seller directs
the consumer to the financer to arrange the loan prior to the
sale and the financer cooperates by providing favorable loan
terms.
The arguments against permitting sales financers to be
insulated from consumer defenses were accepted in varying
degrees by many state courts and legislatures prior to the de-
velopments of the Kentucky holder in due course legislation
and the FTC rule.10 While some sales financers may still sin-
cerely believe that the promulgation of the FTC rule was akin
to dropping "an A-bomb to kill a fly,"" exposure to consumer
defenses for such creditors appears to be here to stay.
9 See generally R. Rohner, Holder in Due Course in Consumer Transactions: Re-
quiem, Revival, or Reformation? 60 CORNELL L.R. 503, 515-17 (1975).
," For discussions of the Kentucky judicial developments concerning freedom from
defenses, see Rohner at 515-24; Comment, 58 Ky. L.J. 850 (1970).
" Statement of Banker's Independent Ass'n, BNA ANTrRUST AND TRADE REG.
REP., Release No. 767 at A-4 (1976).
[Vol. 65
KENTUCKY LAW SURVEY
B. The FTC Rule
Few consumer sellers or sales financers can afford to ignore
the FTC rule. It is based on the conclusion that the use of
promissory notes, waiver of defense clauses, or direct loans in
situations where the seller and lender are acting in concert in
consumer credit sale transactions is an unfair or deceptive act
or practice within the meaning of section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act.'2 It would be unwise for any seller to assume
he need not comply because his business is local. The Act was
amended in 1975 to broaden the FTC's jurisdiction from mat-
ters "in" to matters "in or affecting" commerce.'3 Thus, the
Commission's reach extends to intrastate transactions which
have the requisite effect on interstate commerce, and is coex-
tensive with federal constitutional authority." Although in its
present form the FTC rule may be violated only by sellers,
creditors cannot ignore it. Its effect will be to make lenders
subject to many of the claims and defenses which the
12 FTC Statement of Basis and Purpose: What the Revised Rule Does and Why,
BNA ANTmUST AND TRADE REG. REP., Release No. 739 at D-2, D-4 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as FTC Policy Statement]. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
provides:
Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are declared unlawful.
15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(1) (Supp. 1976).
The F.T.C. considered the following reasons for deciding that some consumer sales
financers should be exposed to consumer claims and defenses:
(1) he engages in many transactions where consumers deal infrequently;
(2) he has access to a variety of information systems which are unavailable
to consumers;
(3) he has recourse to contractual devices which render the routine return
of seller misconduct costs to sellers relatively cheap and automatic; and
(4) the creditor possesses the means to initiate a lawsuit and prosecute it
to judgment where recourse to the legal system is necessary.
See FTC Policy Statement at D-2, D-3.
Concerning the FTC's enforcement tools, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 45, 53(b)(1), (2) (1973).
Concerning whether the FTC rule creates a private right of action for its violation, see
generally Guernsey v. Rich Plan, 408 F. Supp. 582 (N.D. Ind. 1976).
IS Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act, 15
U.S.C.A. § 2301 (1975) (Supp. V, 1975); 15 U.S.C. § 45 et. seq. (1975).
11 Id. See 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD. NEws at 7712. See generally Note, The
Magnuson-Moss Amendments to the FTCAct, 61 IOWA L.R. 222, 231 (1975). This same
legislation revised and clarified the Federal Trade Commission's rule-making author-
ity. See 15 U.S.C. § 57a (Supp. 1976). Concerning the FTC's rule-making authority
prior to the 1975 Amendments, see National Petroleum Refiner's Association v. F.T.C.,
482 F.2d 672 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. den. 415 U.S. 951 (1974).
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consumer-debtor could assert against the seller. It will also
have this impact on banks even though they are not subject to
direct regulation by the FTC.' 5 And under a proposed amend-
ment to the FTC rule, creditors may be included as potential
violators of the rule in the future.'"
1. Scope of the Rule
The scope of the rule is delineated by its definitions. The
definition for "consumer" indicates that the rule applies to
sales or leases to a natural person of goods or services for per-
sonal, family, or household uses, but not to consumer transac-
tions involving only realty or intangible personal property.'
7
Unlike the Truth in Lending Act, the FTC rule does not apply
to transactions in which goods or services are acquired primar-
ily for agricultural purposes and the amount financed is
$25,000 or less.18 The FTC rule's definitions for "financing a
sale" and "purchase money loan" expressly incorporate the
limitations of the meaning of the words "credit sale" and
"finance charge" used in the Truth in Lending Act and its
regulations. As a result, a financed sale is "any sale with re-
spect to which consumer credit is extended or arranged by the
,1 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(6) (1973). Concerning the duty of the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System to consider the promulgation of regulations prohibiting
acts or practices of banks which are substantially similar to those prohibited by a trade
regulation rule, see 15 U.S.C. § 57a(5)(C)(f)(1) (1975); 41 Fed. Reg. 7110 (1976).
" The proposed FTC amendment provides:
§ 433.1 (This section is unchanged by the proposed amendment. See supra
note 1.) § 433.2. . .In connection with any Purchase Money Loan (as that
term is defined in § 433.1) or any sale or lease of goods or services, in or
affecting commerce as "commerce" is defined in the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act, it constitutes an unfair or deceptive act or practice within the
meaning of Section 5 of that Act, for a seller or a creditor, directly or indi-
rectly, to take or receive a consumer credit contract which fails to contain
the following provision in at least ten point, boldface type:
NOTICE
Any holder of this consumer credit contract is subject to all claims and
defenses which the debtor could assert against the seller of goods or services
obtained pursuant hereto or with the proceeds hereof. Recovery hereunder
by the debtor shall be limited to amounts paid by the debtor hereunder.
16 C.F.R. § 433 (1975).
' See KRS §§ 355.2-105, 355.9-105, and -106 (1958).
" See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h) (1968); 12 C.F.R. § 226.3(e) (1976).
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seller"'" and includes open end credit plans which do not in-
volve a "credit card issuer" and contracts in the forms of bail-
ments or leases if they are "disguised" sale arrangements.
20
Also, a purchase by a consumer involving an expenditure of
more than $25,000 is not within the rule.
It must also be noted that credit card transactions are
exempted from the FTC rule through the definition of
"creditor." Preservation of claims in the credit card context is
dealt with by special federal legislation.2 1 In addition, the most
important scope questions under the rule are likely to be those
concerning transactions which may involve a "purchase money
loan."2
2. The Rule and Discount Transactions
The mechanics of the FTC rule in discount transactions
are not difficult. It is a violation for any person who sells or
leases goods or services to consumers in the ordinary course of
business to, directly or indirectly, take or receive, any instru-
ment which evidences or embodies a debt arising from a
"financed sale" unless it contains the following legend in the
requisite type face:
Any holder of this consumer credit contract is subject to
all claims and defenses which the debtor could assert against
the seller of goods or services obtained pursuant hereto or
with the proceeds hereof. Recovery hereunder by the debtor
shall not exceed amounts paid by the debtor hereunder.?
" 15 U.S.C. § 1602(g) (1968); 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(t) (1976).
2Id.
21 See 15 U.S.C. § 166(i) (1974).
22 See infra section I(B) and (C).
16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1975). Concerning placement of notice:
In the event that more than one written instrument contains or embod-
ies the rights and duties of the buyer and seller, the Rule does not require
redundant placement of the Notice. The Notice need appear once, in any
location which renders it a clear term or condition of the written credit
agreement. Incorporation by reference in multiple credit documents is ap-
propriate and satisfies the Rule as long as the documentation makes it clear
to both the consumer and any holder that the consumer's written credit
obligation is subject to the Notice.
In practical terms, this means that there is no need for re-execution of
outstanding open-end credit contracts. It is sufficient if consumers are in-
formed through a notation on sales slips or bills, and if the master files are
19761
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The claims or defenses relating to the goods or services
referred to in the legend arise under law external to the rule and
include state law causes of action for breach of warranty, fraud
in the inducement, failure of consideration, and negligence.
24
No "new" claims or defenses are created by the rule. 25 As a
result of the legend, one who finances sales through discounting
or other "holders"2 of the consumer credit contract become
subject to claims and defenses. In addition, the consumer is
entitled to set his defenses off against the creditor's claim, and
may claim an affirmative recovery for amounts already paid.
Several aspects of the rule in regard to discount financing
merit further discussion. First, the means chosen by the Fed-
eral Trade Commission to make creditors subject to claims or
defenses does not render this form of sales financing illegal or
prohibit the use of promissory notes or installment sales agree-
ments. Rather, it requires that consumer credit contracts con-
tain a precise reproduction of the legend which becomes a part
of the agreement between the consumer and the seller. As a
result, creditors cannot rely on any contractual means, such as
a waiver of defense clause, to cut off claims or defenses. Con-
ceivably, a seller might attempt to include both the legend and
a waiver of defense clause or some more limited qualification
concerning the assertion of defenses in an installment sales
agreement. However, it is unlikely that any court will ever have
to interpret such language because its insertion would be a
violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act.2
Although those persons financing consumer sales through dis-
tagged in any way sufficient to put a subsequent holder on notice under state
law.
FTC Staff Guidelines, BNA ANTITRUST AND TRADE REG. REP., Release No. 764 (1976)
at G-3 [hereinafter cited as FTC Staff Guidelines]. The guidelines were not formally
reviewed or adopted by the FTC, and do not alter or amend either the rule or the FTC
Policy Statement. Compare KRS § 355.1-201(10) (1958).
24 See generally Rohner at 511-15.
25 See FTC Staff Guidelines at G-1, G-2.
26 "Holder" is not limited by the rule to its commercial paper meaning of a
"person who is in possession of. . .an instrument. . . drawn, issued or indorsed to
him or to his order or to bearer or in blank." KRS § 355.1-201(20) (1958). This term is
not specifically defined by the rule. "Creditor" is defined to include a person who
"finances the sale of goods or services to consumers on a deferred payment basis." 16
C.F.R. § 433.1(c). See note 52 and accompanying text, infra.
21 See FTC Staff Guidelines at G-2.
[Vol. 65
KENTUCKY LAW SURVEY
counting can still take promissory notes, the legend is clearly
effective to prevent such persons from claiming holder in due
course status.
2
Second, as a result of the rule, discount sales financers will
"stand in the shoes" of sellers in so far as their right to enforce
payment on consumer credit contracts is concerned, but in a
position not fully analogous to that of an assignee of a contrac-
tual right to receive payment. Such an assignee is subject to
defenses, but not to affirmative claims by the debtor.29 Under
the FTC rule, the required notice must state that recovery by
the debtor is limited to amounts paid by the debtor under the
consumer credit contract and is intended to indicate that the
consumer may assert by way of an affirmative claim, as well
as by defense, the right not to pay all or any part of the out-
standing balance owed the creditor pursuant to the contract."
A creditor need not be concerned about exposure to consequen-
tial damages greatly in excess of the price of the goods pur-
chased because of these limitations. However, creditors will
take no solace from the arguable operation of the rule to make
them disgorge payments made pursuant to a consumer credit
contract but not received by the creditor such as an initial
down payment made directly to the seller. Nor will creditors
welcome the fact that the rule does not expressly limit the time
during which consumers may assert their rights against finan-
cers to a period shorter than that provided by extra-rule stat-
utes of limitations. Such statutes apparently continue to con-
trol transactions under the rule, with the result that the finan-
cer may remain liable to the consumer even after he has been
paid in full.3 ' Also, the rule does not require that any steps be
taken by the consumer to obtain satisfaction from the seller
before the consumer may assert claims or defenses against the
financer.3
2
11 See KRS §§ 355.3-104, -302 (1958). See generally United States v. Farrington,
172 F. Supp. 797 (D.C. Mass. 1959).
" See Rohner at 554.
10 See FTC Staff Guideline at G-2. One might argue that the financer should cease
to be liable to the consumer after the term of the consumer credit contract has expired.
See Statement of U.S. League of Savings and Loan Ass'n, BNA ANTITRUST AND TRADE
REG. REP., Release No. 780 at A-8 (1976).
31 Id.
31 Law extrinsic to the rule may require the consumer to take certain steps or lose
his claim or defense against the seller. See KRS §§ 355.2-607(3) (a); 355.2-714(1) (1958).
1976]
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Finally, the required legend indicates that the holder of a
consumer credit contract "is subject to all claims and defenses
which the debtor could assert against the seller of goods or
services obtained pursuant" to the contract. This provision
leaves considerable room for interpretation. Suppose, for exam-
ple, a consumer purchases a stereo for cash on November 1.
The next day he purchases a color television on credit from the
same seller, executing a consumer credit contract which is dis-
counted to a finance company. The television set performs sa-
tisfactorily, but the stereo is defective and raises a claim for
breach of warranty. The FTC rule could be interpreted to per-
mit the consumer to assert the stereo breach of warranty as a
claim or defense against the finance company seeking payment
on the television paper under typical permissive rules of civil
procedure in regard to counterclaims." Fortunately, the FTC
has indicated that such an interpretation would go beyond the
rule's underlying intent." In the words of the FTC, the holder's
obligations are intended to be limited to those "arising from
the transaction which he finances. '35 Questions concerning the
scope of a particular "transaction" might also be resolved
through reference to the policy analysis which underlies the
FTC rule.
3
1
3. The Rule and Direct Loan Transactions
The Federal Trade Commission determined that a failure
to include direct loan sales financing within the scope of the
rule would facilitate avoidance of its effect, and would amount
to a failure to deal with a method of consumer sales financing
in which, under certain circumstances, the lender should be
subject to claims or defenses of the consumerY.3 As a result, the
rule was drafted to force sellers to insure that direct loan credi-
tors would include a legend preserving claims or defenses in
consumer credit contracts. The legend, which becomes a part
3 See KRS § 355.2-210 (1958); Ky. R. Civ. P. 13.
3 See FTC Staff Guidelines at G-2.
35 Id.
31 See supra note 12. The law of assignments may also provide some guidance,
although it must be noted that such state law may be preempted by the FTC rule to
the extent it is inconsistent with it. See note 57 infra.
-" See FTC Staff Guidelines at G-3.
[Vol. 65
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of the contract between the consumer and the lender, makes
any holder of the contract subject to all claims or defenses
which the consumer could assert against the seller and permits
the consumer to recover amounts paid. It is a violation of Sec-
tion 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act for a seller to
accept the proceeds of a loan within the rule unless the con-
sumer credit contract made in connection with the loan con-
tains the legend. The proposed amendment to the rule would
make it a violation of the Act for creditors to take a consumer
credit contract which does not contain the legend.
Determining which direct loan creditors should be subject
to the rule, and then drafting the rule to include only these
financers, proved to be a difficult problem. In its present form,
the rule relies on the definition of "purchase money loan""8 to
perform this line-drawing function." This definition narrows
the rule's scope to direct loans in which the seller "refers"
consumers to the creditor or is "affiliated" with the creditor.
Concerning this definition, the FTC has stated in its recent
Statement of Enforcement Policy that:
The affiliation test applies where the lender and seller
are part of the same business entity, or where there is a preex-
isting formal or informal contractual agreement or business
arrangement to engage in concerted activity in connection
with the financing of consumer goods and services. The refer-
ral test does not contemplate a preexisting agreement of this
type. It encompasses relationships in which the lender and
seller cooperate to channel purchases on a continuing basis.
Compare KRS § 355.9-107 (1958).
3, An earlier version of the rule utilized a definition of "related creditor" and a
listing of enumerated fact situations which showed a sufficiently close relationship
between the seller and financer to raise a rebuttable presumption that the rule should
be imposed. See FTC Policy Statement at D 5-6. These fact situations were:
1) relation by blood or marriage between seller and creditor;
2) and 3) relation due to preparation of forms used in processing credit;
4) common control or affiliation of seller and creditor;
5) joint venture;
6) payment of consideration by creditor to seller;
7) guarantee of loan by seller;
8) five or more loans;
9) relation by knowledge of seller misconduct.
40 Fed. Reg. 53515 (1975).
The present rule is designed to encompass all of the enumerated situations except the
ninth, which the FTC decided raised too many problems of proof. Id.
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Such a course of conduct results in a de facto or implied
relationship. If the seller is sending buyers to a creditor with-
out the express or implied agreement of the creditor or with-
out any concerted or cooperative activity between the seller
and creditor in connection with the financing of consumer
sales, the transaction is not within the Rule. It is important
to note that such agreement or concerted or cooperative ac-
tivity must relate to the actual financing of the sale and not
to ancillary conduct such as perfecting a security interest."
It is apparent that the two standards will overlap when
applied to many fact situations. It may prove difficult to draw
a line between a preexisting "informal business arrangement"
under the affiliation test and a "course of conduct" which re-
sults in a "de facto or implied relationship" under the referral
test. However, the more important line drawing will occur in
separating those relationships which are covered by at least one
of the tests and those situations which are not covered by either
test. The following hypothetical cases should be of some assis-
tance.4
The affiliation test would be met in the following cases,
therefore requiring the consumer credit contract to contain the
legend.
1. A seller has an agreement with a creditor to maintain
loan application forms in the seller's office. When a buyer
requests financing, the seller assists the buyer in filling out
the forms.
2. A seller regularly sends his customers to a particular
creditor. The creditor, in turn, agrees to provide a favorable
financing arrangement for the seller's inventory or directly or
indirectly provides some other consideration.
3. A seller regularly sends his customer to a particular credi-
tor. The creditor agrees that as long as the seller continues
to refer his customers, their loan applications will be pro-
cessed or approved on an expedited basis where the borrower
meets certain lending criteria but before a full credit check
,0 FTC Statement of Enforcement Policy, BNA ANTITRUST AND TRADE REG. REP.,
Release No. 777 at G-1 (1974) [hereinafter cited as FTC Statement of Enforcement
Policy]. The public was given until October 15, 1976, to comment on the Statement
of Enforcement Policy.
1, Some of the lypothetical cases are taken from or based upon examples given
in the FTC's Statement of Enforcement Policy.
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is completed.
4. Seller regularly discounts consumer paper to creditor.
According to the FTC, cases I and 2 are examples of situa-
tions in which there is a preexisting agreement rising to the
level of a contract as defined by the rule. As a result, there is
"affiliation" between the seller and creditor. In case 3, there is
a business arrangement which also constitutes an "affiliation."
In all three of the cases there is the type of cooperative activity
on a continuing basis which justifies application of the rule.4"
Case 4 is also a situation in which the FTC apparently
intends to require sellers to make certain that any consumer
credit contract made in connection with a purchase money loan
from the creditor contains the legend.43 This is the case even if
the direct loan to the consumer is an isolated occurrence and
there are no other facts demonstrative of an agreement or con-
certed or cooperative activity between the seller and creditor
with respect to direct loan financing. This may be overly bur-
densome on sellers (and might also be burdensome on creditors
if the amended FTC rule is adopted)44 who have no direct loan
affiliation with any creditor and who rely on discounting. Such
sellers would seemingly be required to determine where the
consumer obtained his funds and, if it turns out that they were
obtained from a discount financer with whom the seller does
business, would then have to ask the creditor and consumer to
execute a new set of loan papers which contain the legend. The
FTC has attempted to ameliorate some of the harshness in
such situations by stating that when the objective circumstan-
ces surrounding the transaction between a consumer and seller
do not indicate the source of the proceeds or do not provide
reason to believe that the proceeds may be from a purchase
money loan, there is no obligation to investigate the source of
the proceeds further. An objective "reasonable seller under
,2 See FTC Statement of Enforcement Policy at G-2; FTC Staff Guidelines at G-
4.
" See FTC Statements of Enforcement Policy at G-1.
" See 16 C.F.R. § 433 (1975).
, FTC Statement of Enforcement Policy at G-2. This will benefit sellers in other
situations as well. For example, a seller might have a direct loan relationship with a
financer but be unaware that a particular consumer unilaterally borrowed funds from
the financer prior to making a purchase.
1976]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
the circumstances" test is contemplated.46 For example, if a
consumer pays for a purchase with cash and there are no other
facts which would reasonably suggest the possibility of a pur-
chase money loan, the seller has no duty to investigate further.
On the other hand, there would be such a duty if the consumer
paid with a bank draft payable jointly to the seller and the
consumer which is drawn on a bank with a discounting ar-
rangement with the seller. 7 Once a seller is on notice, he should
not rely on the consumer to learn whether the notice was in-
cluded in the consumer credit contract. His best course of ac-
tion would be to go directly to the creditor.
It should be noted that there is an "affiliation" when there
is common control. A common control situation would exist
when the same holding company owns all the shares in
brother-sister seller and sales financing corporations. The two
corporations are deemed affiliated by the FTC even if there is
no evidence of actual concerted activity with respect to con-
sumer sales financing. Common control becomes less clear
when an individual or group of shareholders owns shares in
both companies, but there are also shareholders who own
shares in only one company or the other. According to the FTC,
this would constitute common control if the two companies are
owned by substantially the same individuals. A parent seller
with a wholly owned subsidiary finance company would also
present a common control situation.
Cases in which there is no affiliation would include the
following:
5. Seller maintains a checking account at creditor bank.
Creditor bank holds the mortgage on seller's business prem-
ises.
6. Creditor has loaned money to seller and has taken a float-
ing lien in seller's inventory of consumer goods as security.
Seller periodically supplies creditor with information con-
cerning the state of its inventory and permits creditor to peri-
odically inspect the inventory.
4I Id.
" The FTC has indicated that there is no duty to inquire further if a buyer pays
for a seller's product or service with a personal check and there are no other circum-
stances which point to a purchase money loan. See FTC Statement of Enforcement
Policy at G-3.
Is See FTC Statement of Enforcement Policy at G-1.
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If a consumer borrows money from the creditor described in
situation 5 and utilizes the proceeds to purchase consumer
goods from the seller, the seller should have no duty to require
the presence of the legend in the consumer credit contract exe-
cuted by the buyer and delivered to the creditor. Although the
creditor and seller in each case are related through business
dealings, these dealings are not sufficiently related to consumer
sales financing for there to be an affiliation.49
Situation 6 could be considered an indirect form of con-
sumer sales financing since the creditor's inventory financing
enables the seller to sell to consumers. However, given no other
facts, there is not sufficient concerted or cooperative activity
relating directly to the actual financing of individual consumer
sales." This would apparently still be true if case 6 were
amended to state that the creditor's security interest also cov-
ered the accounts receivable arising when inventory was sold
on sale credit to consumers who did not obtain direct loan
financing.' However, if the accounts receivable were evidenced
by consumer credit contracts entered into by the consumer and
seller, the FTC rule would literally require that the contract
contain the legend even though the creditor would have to
foreclose on the seller to become a "holder" of the consumer
credit contracts.
52
The following case illustrates the type of "referral" which
is contemplated by the definition of purchase money loan.
7. A buyer asks a seller for credit information. The seller
suggests a creditor, calls up the creditor to determine whether
the creditor will lend money to the particular buyer, and then
sends the buyer to the creditor. Seller and creditor have no
agreement, formal or informal, to refer customers.
A referral relationship requires a course of conduct. Therefore,
situation 7 does not reflect a referral as that word is used in the
definition of purchase money loan. However, the relationship
would be created if such channeling continues.53 It should be
" Id.
0Id.
" Id. See KRS § 355.9-306 (1958).
52 See supra § I(A); KRS § 355.9-502.
See FTC Statement of Enforcement Policy at G-2.
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noted that a referral relationship can exist in the absence of any
specific quid pro quo for the seller making the referrals.
The following are examples of situations in which there is
no "referral."
8. A buyer asks a seller for credit sources. Seller provides a
list of lenders in the area and provides information on the
availability of credit from them as an accommodation to his
customers. The seller does not contact a creditor to arrange
credit for the customers.
9. A seller routinely suggests that customers in need of
credit go to a particular source or sources of financing. While
the creditor is aware that seller is sending some of his custom-
ers, the creditor does not provide any tacit or explicit quid pro
quo, and seller and financer have no relationship that would
constitute an affiliation. Seller and creditor do not otherwise
cooperate except insofar as may be necessary to arrange pay-
ment, perfect a security, or otherwise finalize the transaction.
In case 8 there is no referral because there is no concerted or
cooperative activity.54 Seller is merely providing information.
The FTC has indicated that there is also no referral in situa-
tions like case 9 because of the lack of some further affirmative
act by the seller to promote the consumation of the loan.55 A
simple suggestion is not a referral no matter how often it is
repeated.
C. The Kentucky Legislation
The recent Kentucky holder in due course legislation is a
statute with a limited sphere of application. First, it does not
apply to consumer credit contracts which are in compliance
with the FTC rule or regulations promulgated by other federal
agencies with jurisdiction relating to the preservation of con-
sumer claims and defenses in credit transactions.56 Second, the
FTC rule itself may have preemptive effect under the suprem-
acy clause of the federal constitution." Given its broad reach
54 Id.
Id.
56 Concerning the constitutionality of Kentucky legislation which delegates legis-
lative power to other state or federal legislative bodies, see Commonwealth v. Asso-
ciated Industries of Kentucky, 370 S.W.2d 584 (Ky. 1963).
" U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2. See generally Verkuil, Preemption of State Law by the
Federal Trade Commission, 1976 DUKE L.J. 225 (1976).
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to transactions "affecting commerce," most sellers will be re-
quired to comply with the FTC rule and, if they do so, will be
able to ignore the Kentucky legislation safely. However, the
Kentucky legislation is briefly analyzed below for those sellers
or creditors who may be subject to it.
The Kentucky legislation, as does the FTC rule, utilizes
definitions to outline its scope. There are few departures in the
Kentucky definitions from their counterparts in the FTC rule.
The rule uses the phrase "financing a sale" to describe the
types of vendor credit extensions subject to the rule, and incor-
porates by reference the Truth in Lending Act's definition of
"credit sale."58 The Kentucky legislation uses the phrase "in
which credit is extended by a seller or lessor in connection with
a sale or lease to a consumer" for the same purpose." Surpris-
ingly, the Kentucky legislation contains a definition for
"purchase money loan." Its presence is an anomoly since the
Act does not actually affect direct loan transactions.
The Kentucky legislation is intended to cover discount
financing utilizing negotiable instruments or installment sales
contracts containing waiver of defense clauses. It makes the
"assignee" of the rights of the seller or lessor subject to all
defenses of the buyer against the seller or lessor arising out of
the sale or lease. The word "assignee" must be intended to refer
to creditors who are defined by the Act as including persons
who, in the ordinary course of business, finance the sale of
goods or services to consumers on a deferred payment basis."
However, there is no "assignee" in the context of a direct loan
to a consumer. In sharp contrast with the FTC rule, the Ken-
tucky act limits the assignee's liability to the amount owing to
the assignee at the time the defense is asserted against him,
and states that the defense can only be asserted as a matter of
defense to or set off against a claim by the assignee. The gen-
eral approach of the Kentucky act is also different. Rather than
requiring the insertion of a legend which makes it impossible
for holder in due course status to arise or for an installment
See note 5 supra.
' Compare KRS § 371.210(6) (1962) with KRS § 190.090(2) (1956).
' The Kentucky legislation also excludes credit card issuers from the definition
of creditor. No other Kentucky statute covers freedom from defenses in the credit card
context. See generally KRS § 434.560 (1970).
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contract to contain language which could be interpreted as
containing an agreement waiving defenses, the Kentucky act
merely states that an assignee is subject to defenses. As a re-
sult, an assignee might find himself subject to defenses pur-
suant to the Kentucky act despite the complete silence of a
consumer credit contract on the matter in violation of the FTC
rule.
11. OTHER DEVELOPMENTS
There were a number of other commercial law and con-
sumer credit developments during the past survey year which,
though not as far reaching as the FTC rule, may be of signifi-
cance to Kentucky practitioners. The purpose of this section is
to note two of them in summary fashion.
A. Uniform Commercial Code Statutes of Frauds
In the case of Shpilberg v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner
& Smith, Inc. "1 the Supreme Court of Kentucky considered the
U.C.C. Article VIII statute of frauds which applies to invest-
ment securities transactions. In particular, the Court consid-
ered the portion of the statute of frauds which provides:
(1) A contract for the sale of securities is not enforceable by
way of action or defense unless ... within a reasonable time
a writing in confirmation of the sale or purchase and suffi-
cient against the sender under paragraph (a) has been re-
ceived by the party against whom enforcement is sought and
he has failed to send written objection to its contents within
ten (10) days after its receipt .... 11
The Article II statute of frauds for the sale of goods contains a
similar provision. 3 The Shpilberg Court decided that the fail-
ure of a party in receipt of a written confirmation of a contract
:1 535 S.W.2d 227 (1976).
62 KRS § 355.8-319 (1958).
'3Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing confirmation
of the contract and sufficient against the sender is received and the party
receiving it has reason to know its contents, it satisfies the requirements of
subsection (1) against such party unless written notice of objection to its
contents is given within ten (10) days after it is received.
KRS § 355.2-201 (1958).
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to object within 10 days, not only satisfies the requirements of
the statute of frauds, but also conclusively proves the existence
of the contract itself. Speaking of the effect of retention of the
confirmation for 10 days, the Court stated: "[I]f the writing
clearly shows the existence of a contract, it is conclusive evi-
dence of that fact to the extent that it cannot be contradicted
simply by parol evidence that there was no agreement." 4
While the Court recognized that its decision appeared to
conflict with the official comment to the statute of frauds sec-
tion of the Code's sales article and decisions previously handed
down in other states,65 the Court based its decision on what it
described as "the traditional Statute of Frauds."66 In arriving
at this rule, the Kentucky Court attributed a conclusiveness to
a party's failure to object to a confirmatory memorandum in
the face of contrary declarations by other courts 7 and commen-
tators."5 Thus, while the Court in Shpilberg specifically limited
its ruling to those instances when the written memorandum
contains all the essential elements of a contract, it must be
recognized that the Kentucky Supreme Court's view of this
matter deviates markedly from the rule as generally stated.
B. Prejudgment Creditors' Remedies
There were significant occurrences during the past survey
year with respect to Kentucky's statutory prejudgment reme-
dies. Those which do not involve an exercise of "state action,"
as well as those which do should be noted.
6 9
In Murphy v. General Motors Acceptance Corp.,7" the
Kentucky Supreme Court gave consideration for the first time
11 535 S.W.2d at 230.
5 American Parts Co., Inc. v. Amercian Arbitration Ass'n, 154 N.W.2d 5 (Ct. App.
Mich. 1967); Harry Rubin & Sons, Inc., v. Consolidated Pipe Co. of America, 143 A.2d
472 (Pa. 1959).
" 535 S.W.2d at 230.
,7 See, e.g., Automotive Spares Corp. v. Archer Bearings Co., 382 F. Supp. 513
(N.D. Ill. 1974); C.M.I. Clothesmakers, Ind. v. A.S.K. Knits Inc., 380 N.Y.S.2d 447
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975).
" See generally BENDER'S U.C.C. SERVICE, DUESENBERG-KING, SALES AND BULK
TNASFERS UNDER THE UNIFORM COMMFRCLAL CODE, § 204[1][a] (1976); T. WHITE &
R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 49 (1972).
" For a discussion distinguishing these two statutory types, see Weinberg,
Kentucky Law Survey-Commercial Law, 63 Ky. L.J. 727 n.2 (1975).
70 No. 73-919 (Ky. March 5, 1976).
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to a claim that the Commonwealth's self-help repossession
statute7' violated fourteenth amendment due process require-
ments set forth in Fuentes v. Shevin .7 The trial court in
Murphy had granted the defendant's motion for a summary
judgment based upon a finding that there was no "state ac-
tion" present, and therefore the fourteenth amendment notice
and hearing requirements as set forth in Fuentes were inapplic-
able. In a memorandum opinion per curiam, the Kentucky
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court, and stated that since
the repossession involved no "judicial process," no "state ac-
tion" took place and the Fuentes decison did not apply. The
Kentucky Court thus took a position consistent with that pre-
viously espoused by the Sixth Circuit in Gary v. Darnell.
73
While Kentucky's Supreme Court affirmed the constitu-
tionality of the state's existing "self-help" repossession statute,
Kentucky's General Assembly rewrote the law concerning pre-
judgment remedies which do involve "state action." The legis-
lation was enacted to bring those statutory provisions within
the dictates of the United States Supreme Court.
7, KRS § 355.9-503 (1958).
72 407 U.S. 67 (1972). The relevant United States Supreme Court developments
and pre-Murphy Kentucky case law are discussed in Weinberg, supra note 69.
7 505 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1974).
7, Senate Bill 23 (codified in various sections of KRS chapter 425). For a discus-
sion of these new statutory provisions, see Mapother, Kentucky's New Prejudgment
Seizure Law, Ky. BENCH AND BAR 20 (1976).
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